Received: 29 January 2011 / Accepted: 31 October 2011
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract Previous work suggests that moral intensity and
the perceived importance of an ethical issue can influence
individual ethical decision making. However, prior
research has not explored how the various dimensions of
moral intensity might differentially affect PIE, or how
moral intensity might function together with (or in the
presence of) PIE to influence ethical decision making. In
addition, prior work has also not adequately investigated
how the operational context of an organization, which may
embody conditions or practices that create barriers to ethical
decision making, may differ from other functional
areas of an organization. Consequently, this study investigated
the relationships among moral intensity, perceived
ethical issue importance, and three stages of the ethical
reasoning process: recognition of an ethical issue, ethical
judgment, and ethical intention. Using an internet-based,
self-report survey containing two operations management
scenarios and various ethics measures, information was
collected from business professionals working for a Midwestern
financial services organization. The hierarchical
regression results indicated that some dimensions of moral
intensity were positively related to PIE, ethical issue recognition,
and ethical judgment, and that PIE was associated
with increased ethical issue recognition and ethical judgment.
The steps of ethical reasoning were also positively
interrelated.
Keywords Moral intensity Importance of ethical issue
Ethical reasoning Operation management
Introduction and Background
Given the frequency of unethical conduct, understanding
the nature of employees’ ethical decision making is an
important concern in both academic and organizational
settings. In particular, researchers try to identify the factors
that encourage employees to reason and behave ethically so
that prescriptive guidance can be provided to enhance the
process (e.g., Kish-Gephart et al. 2010), while practicing
managers hope to develop policies and programs that
strengthen employees’ ethical resolve on the job (Trevin˜o
and Nelson 2011). This interest in the comprehensive
development of individual ethics can also be found across
many different occupational and industrial contexts, making
it a fairly widespread concern in business (Ferrell et al.
2008; Hunt and Vitell 1986; McClaren 2000; Trevin˜o and
Nelson 2011).
Ethical reasoning is based on employees’ affective,
cognitive, and behavioral responses to corporate dilemmas
(Jones 1991; Rest 1986; Robin et al. 1996). The first step in
this process requires an individual to recognize that a situation
contains an ethical issue or problem, which calls for
further reflection and evaluation (Hunt and Vitell 1986;
Jones 1991; Rest 1986). The next step entails making an
ethical judgment based on broad assessments of the fairness/
equity, justice, relativism, and social contracts
embedded in the ethical situation (Hunt and Vitell 1986;
Reidenbach and Robin 1990). Based on the theory of
planned behavior (Ajzen 1991), or more specifically, the
notion that behavioral attitudes and social mores influence
behavioral intentions and eventual conduct, the third phase
S. Valentine (&) D. Hollingworth
Department of Management, University of North Dakota,
293 Centennial Drive, Mailstop 8377, Grand Forks,
ND 58202-8377, USA
e-mail: sean.valentine@mail.business.und.edu
D. Hollingworth
e-mail: david.hollingworth@business.und.edu
123
J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-011-1107-3
of ethical reasoning involves establishing an intention to
behave consistently with a previous judgment of ethicality
(Hunt and Vitell 1986; Rest 1986). Finally, the last step is
composed of the actual behavior generated by ethical
intentions (Jones 1991; Rest 1986). Previous empirical
research demonstrates that these steps are positively
interrelated either directly or indirectly (Barnett and
Valentine 2004; Fleischman et al. 2007; Singhapakdi et al.
1996, 1999, 2000; Valentine and Barnett 2007; Valentine
et al. 2010).
The ethical decision-making process is influenced by
many factors that operate at different levels of influence.
For instance, an individual’s ethics can be shaped by personal
characteristics such as demographics, personality,
dispositions, moral philosophies, and ethical ideologies
(Kish-Gephart et al. 2010; Loe et al. 2000; O’Fallon and
Butterfield 2005). Ethical reasoning can also be influenced
by an individual’s immediate work context, which can
include broad cultural characteristics, climate-based factors,
professional orientation and discipline, and values
related to ethics (Douglas et al. 2001; Kish-Gephart et al.
2010; Singhapakdi et al. 2000; Valentine and Barnett 2007;
Valentine et al. 2010), or by policies such as codes of
conduct and ethics training that strengthen this context
(Adams et al. 2001; Valentine and Barnett 2002; Valentine
and Fleischman 2004, 2008).
There also exist other factors that function as barriers to
ethical decision making that are particularly relevant to
business operations. In particular, Trevin˜o and Nelson
(2011) discuss the adverse effects that cognitive scripts can
have on individual ethics. ‘‘Scripts are cognitive frameworks
that guide human thought and action. Although they
are generally not written down, scripts contain information
about the appropriate sequence of events in routine situations…
Information processing is made much more efficient
because a cognitive script allows the individual to call on
an established behavior pattern and act automatically
without contemplating every decision or action in great
detail’’ (Trevin˜o and Nelson 2011, p. 102). While cognitive
scripts increase efficiency in decision making, these mental
algorithms may also ‘‘short-circuit’’ ethical reasoning
because individuals act in a manner that in consistent with
the mental scripts that have been developed in a particular
occupational environment. An example of the pervasiveness
of scripting in the operations context appears in Gallo
(2004) where a professional group of operations researchers—
professionals who create models of decision making
to deal with operational problems in organizations—were
asked if in their work they considered how their models
related to society; their response was, that they did not,
because that issue was not defined as part of the model’s
‘‘parameters.’’ These builders of decision-making tools and
models were excluding ethical considerations out of hand,
because their mental scripts told them not to think about
anything that was not ‘‘specified’’ for them.
In addition, quantitative analyses such as cost-benefit
analysis can also have a significant adverse impact on
ethical decision making in an operations environment.
According to the Trevin˜o and Nelson (2011):
Attempts to reduce complex decision making to
quantitative terms aren’t uncommon, especially in a
highly competitive business environment…But the
potential disadvantage of reducing the value of
human life to quantitative terms should be clear. Such
simplification can remove moral criteria from the
decision making process and reduce moral awareness…
Clearly these processes that individuals and
organizations use to simplify complex decisions can
have significant implications for the ethical decisions
managers make. Although script processing and
quantitative decision-making criteria clearly help us
to do our jobs more efficiently, they can also strip
ethical considerations from the decision-making
process.
Beyond cost/benefit analysis, other forms of analysis can
also limit ethical considerations. The field of Operations
Research/Management Science (OR/MS) has traditionally
been involved in developing models and tools to facilitate
efficient and effective decision making, particularly in the
context of the operational arm (function) of an organization.
Le Menestrel and Van Wassenhove (2004, p. 478)
illustrate how and why this has occurred:
Traditionally, models used in Operational Research
have aimed at identifying an optimal solution independent
of the perceptions, appreciation and feelings
of the human beings. When this is the case, these
models identify an ‘‘objectively optimal’’ solution
and any subjective value is abstracted. Objective
models of Operational Research exclude ethical
concerns in order to ensure the formal validity of
their solution.
Not only are there no ethical concerns properly
included within objective OR models, there should be
no ethical concerns within them. Otherwise, they
would not be objective anymore and would lose their
scientific legitimacy.
These barriers to ethical reasoning are particularly salient
in the operational function of firms because the process is
typically charged with efficiently organizing and utilizing
many of the firms’ resources to satisfy demand for goods
and services. The pressure to be ‘‘efficient’’ is ever-present
in the operations function, and remains in many firms, a
primary objective of operational performance. In addition,
the application of quantitative methods and models in
S. Valentine, D. Hollingworth
123
operational decision making is pervasive. While the
literature has recognized the importance of ethical considerations,
the debate among operations researchers on where
and how ethical issues should be addressed continues (e.g.,
Brans and Gallo 2007; Gallo 2004; Le Menestrel and Van
Wassenhove 2004; Singer and Singer 1997).
Hypotheses
One of the most consistent predictors of ethical reasoning
is moral intensity, a situation-based factor composed of
unique issue-contingencies that strengthen employees’
ethical reasoning in ethical situations (Jones 1991). The
various dimensions of moral intensity function outside of
both the person and the contextual environment, but
operate in a way that often directly affects an individual’s
perceptions of the decision-making task that exist within
the immediate situation. According to Jones (1991), the six
issue-related components of moral intensity are magnitude
of consequence (seriousness of unethical action’s impact),
social consensus (agreement about negativity of action),
temporal immediacy (swiftness of adverse consequences),
proximity (closeness to those harmed), probability of harm
(likelihood of negative impact), and concentration of effect
(severe impact experienced by few persons). Jones (1991)
originally proposed, but in somewhat ambiguous terms,
that moral intensity should directly impact and/or moderate
the ethical reasoning steps. Furthermore, Jones (1991)
suggested that the moral intensity construct was unitary
insomuch that its dimensions would vary monotonically
with respect to ethical decision-making. However, evidence
from many empirical studies suggests that moral
intensity directly affects, rather than moderates, the steps of
ethical decision making (e.g., Barnett 2001; Barnett and
Valentine 2004; Carlson et al. 2002; Kish-Gephart et al.
2010; Paolillo and Vitell 2002; Singer 1996; Singhapakdi
et al. 1996, 1999; Valentine et al. 2010). In addition, the
weight of evidence from studies that unbundle the dimensions
of moral intensity has generally observed that these
dimensions do not necessarily vary monotonically, and that
the factors affect various stages of ethical reasoning in
different ways (e.g., Barnett 2001; Barnett and Valentine
2004; Carlson et al. 2002; Morris and McDonald 1995;
Singer 1996). Therefore, these components are proposed to
directly influence the steps of the ethical decision-making
process and are investigated individually in this study.
Unfortunately, a rigorous and complete theoretical explanation
as to why these dimensions do not vary monotonically
has not yet been presented in the literature.
Therefore, we provide the following general hypothesis.
This hypothesis is ‘‘general,’’ in that we are treating the
separate dimensions of moral intensity as individual
constructs, not as factors of moral intensity, for reasons
previously discussed. In addition, we have identified three
steps of the ethical reasoning process with which we are
concerned. Therefore, this general hypothesis actually
includes 12 sub-hypotheses (4 dimensions of moral intensity
9 3 steps in the ethical reasoning process) that are
implied by the following general hypothesis. A similar
approach was employed by Barnett and Valentine (2004) to
explore the generalized relationship between moral intensity
and ethical reasoning, and their research determined
that magnitude of the consequences was consistently related
to ethical issue recognition, social consensus was
inconsistently related to ethical issue recognition, and
neither proximity nor temporal immediacy were related to
issue recognition. The same pattern of results was observed
when relating the dimensions of moral intensity to ethical
judgments. With respect to ethical intentions, only magnitude
of consequences was (inconsistently) related to their
behavioral intention measure. In short, these findings suggest
that magnitude of consequences, and perhaps social
consensus, are two dimensions of moral intensity that
might be more consistently related to the early stages of
ethical reasoning, specifically the recognition and judgment
phases. Barnett and Valentine (2004) provided some reasons
as to why temporal immediacy and proximity are less
likely to directly affect ethical reasoning, as well as how
their effects may be overshadowed by the presence of
magnitude of consequences and social consensus; however,
to our knowledge, scant research has, as of yet, been
devoted to theoretically or empirically untangling these
relationships.
The present study seeks to extend this research by (1)
examining key relationships within an operations context
and (2) including the perceived importance of an ethical
issue (PIE) construct as an additional ethical evaluation,
which prior research has established as being associated
with the ethical reasoning process; however, prior research
has not addressed how moral intensity might operate
through or around PIE to influence ethical decision making.
Our additional hypotheses therefore position PIE between
moral intensity and the ethical reasoning process. Finally,
we note that the steps of the ethical reasoning process are
well established in the literature, and that their causal
relationships will be incorporated into our analysis as
appropriate. The following comprehensive hypothesis is
therefore offered:
Hypothesis 1 Each of the dimensions of perceived moral
intensity (seriousness of the consequences, social consensus,
temporal immediacy, and proximity) are positively
related to each of the steps of the ethical reasoning process
(recognition of ethical issue, ethical judgment, and ethical
intention).
Moral Intensity, Issue Importance, and Ethical Reasoning
123
Similar to moral intensity, PIE, which involves the
believed saliency of an ethical problem, should also consistency
influence ethical reasoning. According to Robin
et al. (1996, p. 17), the variable ‘‘is personal and temporal
in character in order to accommodate an individual’s values,
beliefs, needs, perceptions, the special characteristics
of the situation, and the personal pressures existing in an
ongoing basis or at a particular place and time.’’ Robin
et al. (1996) found that PIE was associated with increased
ethical judgment and intention and concluded that PIE
likely occurs in the earlier, more affective/cognitive-based
evaluations of ethical reasoning, and then carries through to
subsequent steps as an individual further engages a situation.
Commenting on studies that pre-dated their own
research, Haines et al. (2008, p. 389) stated, ‘‘PIE was
found to impact the ethical decision-making process in a
manner entirely consistent with Jones’s expectations for
the MI variable,’’ and it is this realization that calls for
further investigation.
Even though previous research has found that PIE
influences ethical judgments and intentions (Cronan et al.
2005; Haines et al. 2008), the degree to which PIE consistently
relates to antecedent constructs such as moral
intensity, as well as the different stages of ethical reasoning,
has not been adequately explored. Indeed, Robin et al.
(1996) presented ‘‘a formal challenge for future research;
namely, to further elaborate on the causal relationship
between PIE and the components of the ethical decisionmaking
process’’ (Haines et al. 2008, p. 388), which logically
extends to the predictors of ethical reasoning as well.
A particularly important topic involves how PIE operates
in relation to the linkages that exist between moral intensity
and ethical decision making. Robin et al. (1996)
‘‘provided empirical evidence attesting to the validity of
the PIE construct and showed that PIE had significant
influence on subjects’ ethical decision-making’’ (Haines
et al. 2008, p. 388), but additional work is needed to clarify
how PIE might work in concert with moral intensity to
enhance ethical reasoning. This issue should be addressed
because the moral intensity construct ‘‘is expected to play a
major role in the recognition of moral issues and, hence, in
the actual engagement of moral decision-making processes
instead of, or in addition to, other decision-making schemata.
Simply stated, the details of moral decision-making
and behavior processes become irrelevant if the person
does not recognize that he or she is dealing with a moral
issue’’ (Jones 1991, p. 391)—a danger that is particularly
relevant, as previously mentioned, in the operational context
or function of organizations. PIE might bolster similar
engagement in an ethical issue, which would position the
variable as another key predictor of individual ethics.
Because PIE is primarily an individual-level variable
that is associated with cognitive processes, the barriers to
ethical decision making noted previously are particularly
salient. Pressures in an operational environment to efficiently
make and implement decisions may contribute to
script processing and/or the application of quantitative
decision tools, which could result in a reduced ability to
perceive and interpret the ethical nuances or moral implications
of a particular situation. These limitations occur
because decision making has been over-simplified through
the use of quantitative models and/or scripts that are
employed by operational personnel or persons evaluating
an operational situation. Therefore, we hypothesize the
following:
Hypothesis 2 The perceived importance of an ethical
issue is positively related to each of the steps of the ethical
reasoning process (recognition of ethical issue, ethical
judgment, and ethical intention).
The hypothesis just stated includes three implicit
hypotheses in the context of this study. Specifically, that
PIE will be positively related to recognition of an ethical
issue, ethical judgment, and ethical intention. Additionally,
prior studies have concluded that in general the steps of
ethical reasoning noted above are positively and causally
related. These relationships, while not specifically
hypothesized for this study, will be accounted for in the
analysis.
According to Robin et al. (1996, p. 17), the PIE variable
‘‘is personal and temporal in character in order to accommodate
an individual’s values, beliefs, needs, perceptions,
the special characteristics of the situation, and the personal
pressures existing in an ongoing basis or at a particular
place and time.’’ The PIE construct should therefore be
considered conceptually distinct from moral intensity
because it functions as an individual-level variable that
more closely drives ‘‘involvement’’ with an ethical issue
and subsequent ethical reasoning, rather than as an issuecontingent
variable related to individual perceptions of
situational characteristics (Robin et al. 1996). Thus, the PIE
construct allows the external characteristics of the issue to
be considered along with the internal states of the individual
to yield a specific degree of moral involvement.
While PIE is conceptually related to moral intensity, Robin
et al. (1996) and ensuing studies have established the
validity of the PIE construct, yet situational characteristics
are often embedded in the PIE construct, which suggests a
strong relationship between moral intensity and PIE. While
it has been proposed that PIE functions in a separate
domain from issue-contingencies and ethical reasoning,
and thus should be enhanced by perceived issue-contingencies
and subsequently increase the likelihood that ethical
issues are recognized, it is not known whether this
assumption withstands rigorous empirical interpretation.
The following hypothesis is therefore presented:
S. Valentine, D. Hollingworth
123
Hypothesis 3 Each of the dimensions of perceived moral
intensity (seriousness of the consequences, social consensus,
temporal immediacy, and proximity) are positively
related to the perceived importance of an ethical issue.
Like preceding hypotheses, this general hypothesis also
infers a number of sub-hypotheses: specifically that the
four dimensions of moral intensity will each be positively
related to PIE.
Despite the existing body of work, additional inquiry is
needed to more clearly identify the antecedents and core
components of the ethical decision-making process, particularly
those factors that might be influenced by different
organizational situations and contexts. For instance, even
though ethical reasoning has been examined in the general
management, marketing, and accounting fields (e.g., Ferrell
and Gresham 1985; Flory et al. 1992; Hunt and Vitell 1986;
McClaren 2000; Trevin˜o 1986), little or no research
focuses on the unique characteristics found in the OR/MS
context. Similarly, the role of moral intensity in operationsoriented
decision making has not been investigated, and
given that operations management relies so heavily on
sound evaluations of situational characteristics, such
inquiry is relevant.
Using two vignettes that were chosen to be directly
relevant to the operational context within an organization,
the purpose of this research was to address these gaps in the
literature by investigating proposed relationships among
moral intensity, PIE, and the ethical decision-making process
(see Fig. 1). According to Jones (1991), the various
dimensions of moral intensity should consistently enhance
recognition of an ethical issue, ethical judgment, and ethical
intention by making individuals focus more readily on
the issue-contingencies embedded in ethical situations.
However, despite Jones’ (1991) contention that the moral
intensity dimensions should vary monotonically to collectively
impact ethical reasoning, empirical evidence suggests
that the moral intensity factors can independently and
uniquely influence ethical reasoning without necessarily
being interrelated (e.g., Barnett 2001; Barnett and Valentine
2004; Carlson et al. 2002; Morris and McDonald 1995;
Singer 1996; Tsalikis et al. 2008). This study therefore
treats the dimensions of moral intensity as independent
constructs with respect to their influence on ethical reasoning,
rather than as a one-dimensional factor that captures
overall perceptions of issue-contingencies. In a
similar manner, the dimensions of moral intensity should
also increase PIE as a result of the relative strength of the
issue-related characteristics found in ethical dilemmas; for
instance, more profound or severe situational factors such
as high magnitude of consequences or increased temporal
immediacy should encourage individuals to believe that the
ethical issues faced are more important. Finally, this
increased saliency should increase the likelihood that ethical
issues are recognized, ethical judgments are made, and
ethical intentions are established.
Method
Data
Information was gathered from a population of 527 business
professionals (from all business functional areas)
working for a financial services organization with locations
in multiple states in the Midwestern U.S. Individuals
working at organizational locations were sent an email
requesting their participation in the study. A link was
provided to an online survey that contained two ethics
vignettes and various measures of ethical reasoning,
organizational context, and job attitudes. This initial wave
of emails resulted in the submission of 144 fully or partially
completed surveys. Approximately 2 weeks after the
first wave, a second round of emails was sent to encourage
further participation, resulting in the submission of an
additional 27 surveys. Finally, a third wave of emails was
sent several weeks later, and 16 questionnaires were submitted,
which resulted in a total of 187 surveys and an
overall approximate response rate of 35.48%.
The business professionals in the sample were on
average 38.84 years of age, 65.3% were female,1 99.3%
were white, and 72.4% were married. The subjects were
reasonably well-educated, with 23.6% having some college,
56.9% possessing a Bachelor’s degree, and 9.0%
possessing a graduate degree. Respondents had an average
of 6.25 years of tenure in their present jobs and 6.47 years
of tenure with their present organization, 85.4% were
employed full-time, and 27.1% were currently employed as
a manager or supervisor. Slightly over one-third of the
survey respondents were from the operations-related areas
of the firm (17.4% indicated that the worked in customer
service, while 16.7% worked in operations). The remaining
respondents were from a mix of other business functions.
Almost 91% had been given an ethics code that governs
work conduct in the organization, and individuals had
received an average of 1.63 hours of ethics training in the
last year and 7.49 hours of ethics training since being
hired.
We evaluated the potential for the adverse impact of
non-response bias by utilizing an analysis of variance to
see if differences in the study’s demographic and focal
variables (averaged item scores) occurred across the three
waves of surveys (Armstrong and Overton 1977). In
addition, cross tabulations and Chi-square statistics were
1 Valid percentages reported.
Moral Intensity, Issue Importance, and Ethical Reasoning
123
evaluated for the (nominal) categorical variables based on
responses provided in the three data collection rounds.
Results indicated that mean differences were present only
for subject age and job tenure, which suggested that nonresponse
bias was not an issue in this study.
Measures
Ethics Scenarios
Ethical decision-making research often relies on vignettes to
replicate realistic problems encountered by employees in the
workplace (e.g., Alexander and Becker 1978; Barnett 2001;
Reidenbach and Robin 1990; Singhapakdi et al. 1996).
Consequently, two ethical scenarios were used to represent
ethical situations in an operational context. One vignette was
developed to explore productivity in a call center, and the
other scenario was adapted from a case problem in an
operations management text that explored a maintenance
problem (Russell and Taylor 2009). Only two scenarios
were included on the survey in the interest of survey length.
Extreme cases of a sensitive nature (losing one’s job, causing
contamination) were covered in the scenarios to initiate
ethical reasoning in subjects. The two vignettes were:
Situation A: Jane is an operations manager who oversees
a call center in a medium-sized organization. The call
center is experiencing poor operational efficiency. Jane
recently received several suggestions from her boss
about improving efficiency, one of which involved a
‘‘quick fix’’ by reducing staff by two workers, and the
other involved some employee retraining that will take
more time and effort to work. Her boss also indicated
that poor efficiency is not viewed favorably in the
company, and that continued poor performance might
cause Jane to lose her annual bonus. All call center
employees are hard-working, have received good performance
reviews, and really need their jobs.
Action: Two days later, Jane calls two workers into her
office to give them the bad news- they no longer work at
the call center.
Situation B: As part of a regular maintenance plan, John
Davis, manager of Prairie States Electrical Service,
considers replacing an existing electrical transformer
that contains a hazardous chemical even though the part
meets all current regulations. If the transformer fails, it
could result in contamination of the surrounding area,
and the firm could be held liable for cleanup and
damages estimated at $10-20 million. Despite these
risks, the chances of part failure and chemical contamination
are very low. A recent risk analysis revealed that
replacing the transformer at a cost of $85,000 eliminates
the possibility of failure, while retaining the transformer
has an estimated cost of only $24,000.
Action: John keeps the existing transformer instead of
replacing it with a newer part.
The survey was designed so that immediately following
each vignette, respondents were asked to respond to items
assessing the different dimensions of moral intensity, PIE,
ethical judgment, and ethical intention. Various other
measures were then presented to survey participants.
Moral Intensity
Four measures developed by Barnett et al. (1999) were
used to measure perceived moral intensity (Barnett 2001;
(+)
(+) (+)
(+)
(+) (+) (+)
(+) (+)
Moral intensity dimensions:
• Seriousness of consequences
• Social consensus
• Temporal immediacy
• Proximity Perceived
importance of
ethical issue
Recognition
of ethical
issue
Ethical
judgment
Ethical
intention
Fig. 1 Hypothesized relationships. Note: Hypotheses are not specified for the recognition of ethical issue-ethical judgment and ethical judgmentethical
intentions linkages; however, these relationships do exist theoretically and are analyzed empirically in this study
S. Valentine, D. Hollingworth
123
Barnett and Valentine 2004). These measures were used
because the present study seeks a more precise understanding
of how the different dimensions of moral intensity
(as opposed to moral intensity in general) are related to both
PIE and the stages of the ethical reasoning process. In
addition, the Barnett et al. (1999) scales arguably provide
significant advantages over more commonly used singleitem
measures of moral intensity, having demonstrated
excellent measurement properties in past studies. These
scales require respondents to read a series of scenario-based
statements describing different dimensions of moral intensity,
and to evaluate these statements using unique sevenpoint
differential scales composed of opposing adjectives
that describe relevant issue-contingencies. Seriousness (or
magnitude) of consequences was evaluated with ‘‘Do you
believe any harm resulting from Jane’s/John’s action will
be…,’’ which was followed by ‘‘minor-severe,’’ ‘‘insignificant-
significant,’’ and ‘‘slight-great.’’ Social consensus was
assessed with ‘‘Please indicate the degree to which you
believe society as a whole considers Jane’s/John’s
action…,’’ and items included ‘‘unethical-ethical,’’ ‘‘wrongright,’’
and ‘‘inappropriate-appropriate.’’ Temporal immediacy
was measured with ‘‘The likelihood that consequences
of Jane’s/John’s action are…,’’ which was followed by
‘‘after a long time-immediately,’’ ‘‘slowly-quickly,’’ and
‘‘gradually-rapidly.’’ Finally, proximity was evaluated with
‘‘Compared to yourself, do you believe those potentially
affected by Jane’s/John’s action are…,’’ and items included
‘‘dissimilar-similar,’’ ‘‘not alike-alike,’’ and ‘‘differentsame.’’
Items were coded so that higher scores represented
increased perceptions of moral intensity, or that the situational
characteristics were not favorable, and composite
values were calculated for each of the variables by averaging
the associated item scores. The coefficient alphas for seriousness
of consequences, social consensus, temporal
immediacy, and proximity were .97, .94, .97, and .98 in the
first scenario and .98, .97, .90, and .99 in the second scenario,
respectively.
Perceived Importance of an Ethical Issue
The PIE variable was measured with a scale developed by
Robin et al. (1996). Respondents were asked to evaluate
various actions described in the scenarios using four sevenpoint
semantic differential scales, which included ‘‘unimportant
issue-extremely important issue,’’ ‘‘insignificant
issue-significant issue,’’ ‘‘issue is of no concern-issue is of
considerable concern,’’ and ‘‘trivial issue-fundamental
issue.’’ Items were coded so that higher scores represented
increased issue importance, and items were summated and
divided by the total number of items. PIE had a coefficient
alpha of .93 in the first scenario and .97 in the second
scenario.
Ethical Decision-Making Process
Ethical reasoning was measured with three different scales.
Recognition of an ethical issue was measured with one item
that asked whether the actions presented in the scenarios
involved ethical issues (Barnett and Valentine 2004;
Fleischman et al. 2007; Valentine and Barnett 2007), and
responses were provided on a seven-point semantic differential
scale composed of ‘‘completely disagree her/his
actions involved an ethical issue-completely agree her/his
actions involved an ethical issue’’ with higher scores suggesting
increased recognition. A moral equity measure was
utilized to evaluate judgments that the questionable actions
presented in the scenarios were unethical (Reidenbach and
Robin 1990). Evaluations were provided on four unique
seven-point semantic differential scales containing opposing
adjectives that represented the ethical judgment construct,
and these items were ‘‘fair-unfair,’’ ‘‘just-unjust,’’
‘‘morally right-not morally right,’’ and ‘‘acceptable to my
family-unacceptable to my family.’’ Items were coded so
that higher scores represented increased moral equity, and
responses were averaged so that higher overall values represented
increased ethical judgments. The scale had a
coefficient alpha of .93 in Scenario 1 and .95 in Scenario 2.
Finally, a four-item measure was used to evaluate ethical
behavioral intentions (Barnett and Valentine 2004; Barnett
et al. 1996; Valentine et al. 2010). Subjects were asked to
indicate whether they would engage in the questionable
actions described in the scenarios with separate seven-point
semantic differential scales containing the adjectives
‘‘likely-unlikely,’’ ‘‘probable-improbable,’’ ‘‘possibleimpossible,’’
and ‘‘definitely would-definitely would not.’’
Items were coded and averaged so that higher overall scores
represented increased ethical intentions, and the scale’s
coefficient alpha was .95 in Scenario 1 and .98 in Scenario 2.
Social Desirability (Control)
Two statements taken from a ten-item social desirability
scale (Crowne and Marlowe 1960; Fischer and Fick 1993;
Strahan and Gerbasi 1972) were used to determine whether
social desirability bias was present. Items were rated with a
seven-point scale anchored by 1 (strongly agree) and 7
(strongly disagree), and items were coded so that higher
scores indicated increased social desirability. The items
were selected based on the results of a non-rotated, initial
exploratory ‘‘principal components’’ factor analysis of the
ten-item measure,2 and a finalized factor analysis of the
2 A value of .65 was used as an acceptable loading benchmark, and
the two items selected had loadings in the first (or primary) factor
above .70 with no cross-loadings above .30; the two items had a
coefficient alpha of .71.
Moral Intensity, Issue Importance, and Ethical Reasoning
123
selected items indicated that each had loadings of .88, the
initial eigenvalue was 1.55, and 77.68% of the variance
was explained. The items were ‘‘There have been occasions
when I took advantage of someone’’ and ‘‘I sometimes try
to get even, rather than forgive and forget.’’ Items scores
were averaged to obtain composite measures of social
desirability, and the scale had a coefficient alpha score of
.71. Since socially based responding is often a concern in
ethics research (Randall and Fernandes 1991), the social
desirability measure was included as a control in the
analysis. In addition, several multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) models were specified to determine
whether key demographic factors were related to the ethics
measures. This analysis indicated that the demographic
variables were generally not strongly related to the focal
variables, which suggested that these factors be excluded
from hypothesis testing.
Analysis
Variable descriptive statistics and correlations were initially
investigated, and a pairwise deletion approach was
used to compensate for missing data. Hierarchical regression
analysis was utilized to test the study’s working
hypotheses, which involved controlling for the effects of
social desirability and other factors on a dependent variable
while isolating the additional explained variance obtained
by adding additional independent variables to the model.
Variables were entered into the regression models based on
their order of appearance/influence in the ethical reasoning
process, with subsequent factors being introduced progressively
in successive iterations of the regression models,
while controlling for the influence of previously examined
steps. For each scenario, a total of four regression models
were specified that contained different dependent variables.
Results
Variable Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Table 1 provides a summary of the variable descriptive
statistics and correlations. The mean values for the issuecontingencies
suggest that individuals perceived generally
moderate levels of moral intensity in the scenarios. The
mean values for the ethical decision-making variables also
indicated that the business professionals recognized the
ethical issues and perceived that these issues were important,
and individuals’ ethical judgments and intentions were
reasonably strong. The mean score for social desirability
was relatively high. The correlation analysis showed that
several dimensions of moral intensity were interrelated,
which implies that perceptions of moral intensity might be
influenced by a variety of issue-related factors present in an
Table 1 Variable descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Scenario 1
1. Seriousness of consequences 5.26 1.32 179 –
2. Social consensus 4.74 1.45 179 .19* –
3. Temporal immediacy 4.66 1.53 176 .50*** .16* –
4. Proximity 4.42 1.59 175 .15* -.12 .07 –
5. Perceived importance of ethical issue 5.81 1.11 177 .47*** .15* .23** .02 –
6. Recognition of ethical issue 4.48 1.90 186 .33*** .08 .10 .00 .35*** –
7. Ethical judgment 5.39 1.30 179 .60*** .34*** .33*** .02 .44*** .33*** –
8. Ethical intention 5.32 1.51 178 .43*** .26*** .22** .10 .30*** .18* .70*** –
9. Social desirability 5.56 1.26 144 .05 .11 .19* -.00 .21* .01 .14 .10 –
Scenario 2
1. Seriousness of consequences 5.13 1.72 158 –
2. Social consensus 4.70 1.68 158 .38*** –
3. Temporal immediacy 3.11 1.44 158 .28*** .08 –
4. Proximity 4.47 1.68 154 -.02 -.08 .00 –
5. Perceived importance of ethical issue 5.68 1.15 153 .31*** .32*** .22** -.01 –
6. Recognition of ethical issue 4.99 1.90 164 .24** .23** .27*** .12 .47*** –
7. Ethical Judgment 4.52 1.65 157 .55*** .61*** .18* -.07 .42*** .31*** –
8. Ethical Intention 4.90 1.75 156 .53*** .55*** .20* -.04 .43*** .25** .83*** –
9. Social Desirability 5.56 1.26 144 -.00 .15 .09 .11 .16 .02 .24** .17 –
*** p\.001, ** p\.01, * p\.05
S. Valentine, D. Hollingworth
123
ethical situation. The moderate inter-relatedness of the
dimensions of moral intensity, and the fact that some
dimensions seemed not to be substantially related to other
dimensions of moral intensity, suggested that moral
intensity, as measured in this study, is not unitary and
monotonically oriented. Many, but not all the moral
intensity dimensions were positively related to PIE and the
different components of ethical decision making, which
supports the notion that issue-related characteristics influence
the ethical decision-making process; however, it also
suggests that different dimensions of moral intensity will
have differing effects on both PIE and ethical reasoning.
Finally, PIE and most of the steps of ethical reasoning were
positively interrelated, suggesting that ethical decisions are
based partly on ethical issue importance, and that decisions
occur through a progression of multiple stages. The only
variables associated with the social desirability measure
were temporal immediacy and PIE in Scenario 1 and ethical
judgment in Scenario 2.
Hierarchical Regression Models
The findings for the hierarchical regression analyses associated
with Scenario 1 are presented in Table 2. The first
analysis included the social desirability measure as predictor
(independent) variable and PIE as the dependent
variable. This model was statistically significant and
increased social desirability was significantly associated
with increased PIE. Adding the moral intensity dimensions
caused a significant change in R2. Seriousness of the consequences
was positively and significantly related to PIE;
however, no other dimensions of moral intensity were
significantly related to PIE.
The second analysis included recognition of an ethical
issue as the dependent variable and social desirability as an
independent variable. The model was not statistically significant.
PIE was then added to the model, which caused a
significant change in R2, with PIE being positively related
to recognition of an ethical issue. Finally, the moral
intensity variables were entered into the model, causing a
significant change in R2. Seriousness of consequences was
associated with increased recognition of an ethical issue.
The third analysis specified ethical judgment as the
dependent variable and social desirability as an independent
variable, and the R2 was not significant. Recognition
of an ethical issue was then entered into the model, which
did cause a significant change in R2; recognition of an
ethical issue was positively related to ethical judgment. PIE
was included in the model in the next step of the analysis,
which also resulted in a significant change in R2, with PIE
being associated with increased ethical judgment. Finally,
the dimensions of moral intensity were entered into the
model, which caused a significant change in R2.
Seriousness of consequences and social consensus were
both positively related to ethical judgment.
The fourth analysis included ethical intention as the
dependent variable and social desirability measure as an
independent variable. This model was not statistically
significant. Ethical judgment was entered into the model
next, which resulted in a significant change in R2, and
ethical judgment was positively related to ethical intention.
The addition of the other focal variables in subsequent
steps did not yield significant changes to the model R2.
The findings for the hierarchical regression analyses
associated with Scenario 2 are presented in Table 3. The
first analysis once again specified PIE as the dependent
variable and social desirability as an independent variable.
The model was not significant. Adding the moral intensity
factors caused a significant change in R2, and seriousness
of the consequences and social consensuses were both
positively related to PIE.
The second analysis included recognition of an ethical
issue as the dependent variable and social desirability as
the independent variable. The model R2 was small and
insignificant. PIE was then included in the model, which
caused a significant change in R2, with PIE being positively
related to recognition of an ethical issue. Finally, the moral
intensity variables were entered into the model, causing a
significant change in R2. Temporal immediacy was associated
with increased recognition of an ethical issue.
The third analysis specified ethical judgment as the
dependent variable and social desirability was introduced as
an independent variable resulting in a significant R2, with
social desirability being positively and significantly associated
with increased ethical judgment. Recognition of an
ethical issue was then entered into the model, which caused a
significant change in R2; recognition of an ethical issue was
positively related to ethical judgment. PIE was included in
the model in the next step of the analysis, which also resulted
in a significant change in R2, with PIE being associated with
increased ethical judgment. Finally, the moral intensity
factors were entered into the model, which caused a significant
change in R2. Seriousness of consequences and social
consensus were both positively related to ethical judgment.
The fourth analysis included ethical intention as the
dependent variable and social desirability and an independent
variable. The model was not statistically significant.
Ethical judgment was entered into the model next,
which resulted in a significant change in R2, and ethical
judgment was positively related to ethical intention. The
addition of recognition of an ethical issue did not cause a
significant change in R2, but the addition of PIE did result
in a model with a significantly enhanced R2, with PIE being
associated with increased ethical intention. The addition of
the moral intensity factors did not yield a significant
change to the model R2 in the final step of the analysis.
Moral Intensity, Issue Importance, and Ethical Reasoning
123
The following section outlines the managerial implications
of these findings, the study’s limitations, and the
suggestions for future research.
Discussion
Hypothesis 1 specified that each of the four types of moral
intensity included in this study would vary positively with
each of the steps of the ethical reasoning process. The
regression analyses revealed that only seriousness of the
consequences (Scenario 1 only) and temporal immediacy
(Scenario 2 only) components were related to ethical recognition
(after controlling for the effects of social desirability
and introduction of the PIE measure). However,
both seriousness of the consequences and social consensus
were related to ethical judgments, and these result held for
both Scenarios 1 and 2, even after controlling for the
effects of social desirability and PIE. None of the components
of moral intensity were directly related to ethical
intentions in our regression analyses after controlling for
social desirability and PIE. We also note that the proximity
component of moral intensity was not related to any of the
stages of ethical reasoning. These results suggest that moral
intensity may have a limited role in influencing recognition
of an ethical issue, and that the type of moral intensity that
is associated with recognition of an ethical issue may be
contingent upon the type of issue. Our analysis provides
much more robust results with respect to the relationship
between moral intensity and ethical judgments. Even after
controlling for social desirability and PIE (which were also
significant), both the seriousness of consequences and
Table 2 Results of hierarchical
regression analysis—Scenario 1
*** p\.001, ** p\.01,
* p\.05
Dependent variable Perceived importance
of ethical issue
Recognition of
ethical issue
Ethical
judgment
Ethical
intention
Independent variable(s) b b b b
Social desirability .21* .01 .14 .10
Step 1 DR2 .04* .00 .02 .01
Seriousness of consequences .48***
Social consensus .04
Temporal immediacy -.05
Proximity -.04
Perceived importance of ethical issue .37***
Recognition of ethical issue .33***
Ethical judgment .70***
Step 2 DR2 .22*** .13*** .11*** .48***
Seriousness of consequences .25*
Social consensus .00
Temporal immediacy -.08
Proximity -.04
Perceived importance of ethical issue .35***
Recognition of ethical issue -.06
Step 3 DR2 .04 .10*** .00
Seriousness of consequences .44***
Social consensus .21**
Temporal immediacy .03
Proximity -.03
Perceived importance of ethical issue .01
Step 4 DR2 .22*** .00
Seriousness of consequences .01
Social consensus .04
Temporal immediacy -.03
Proximity .09
Step 5 DR2 .01
Model F 9.36*** 4.47*** 15.48*** 16.36***
Adjusted R2 .23 .13 .42 .47
N 139 139 139 139
S. Valentine, D. Hollingworth
123
social consensus components of moral intensity consistently
exhibited the ability to explain significant additional
variance in ethical judgments. This suggests that both PIE
and the seriousness of consequences and social consensus
components of moral intensity have direct, but somewhat
unique influences on judgments that are made with respect
to ethical situations.
In a general sense, our analysis supports what has been
observed in many other studies: that moral intensity affects
the ethical decision-making process. However, these results,
placed in the context of other studies that have also found
differential effects of the moral intensity dimensions on
ethical reasoning, suggest that further theoretical development
and empirical investigation is needed to identify how
and why some aspects of moral intensity function on specific
parts of the ethical reasoning process, while others do not
seem to have the same influence or effect.We suggest that a
deeper understanding of the relationship between moral
intensity and the ethical reasoning process is contingent
upon a deeper understanding of the dimensions or components
of moral intensity, and that will require an unbundling
of and necessarily more precise and detailed theorizing
concerning how each component of moral intensity actually
operates. It is also possible that the effects of different
components of moral intensity are contingent upon a number
of factors. For example, differences in scenarios may evoke
different responses in moral intensity. We suggest that a
potentially fruitful line of inquiry would be to explore the
differences in scenarios with respect to the different types of
ethical perspectives that are embedded within them and then
seeking to explain how different perspectives may evoke
differential responses in moral intensity.
Table 3 Results of hierarchical
regression analysis—Scenario 2
*** p\.001, ** p\.01,
* p\.05
Dependent variable Perceived importance
of ethical issue
Recognition of
ethical issue
Ethical
judgment
Ethical
intention
Independent variable(s) b b b b
Social desirability .16 .02 .24** .17
Step 1 DR2 .03 .00 .06** .03
Seriousness of consequences .19*
Social consensus .22*
Temporal immediacy .14
Proximity .00
Perceived importance of ethical issue .48***
Recognition of ethical issue .30***
Ethical judgment .84***
Step 2 DR2 .15*** .22*** .09*** .66***
Seriousness of consequences .03
Social consensus .10
Temporal immediacy .17*
Proximity .14
Perceived importance of ethical issue .31***
Recognition of ethical issue .00
Step 3 DR2 .06* .07*** .00
Seriousness of consequences .35***
Social consensus .38***
Temporal immediacy -.01
Proximity -.06
Perceived importance of ethical issue .12*
Step 4 DR2 .32*** .01*
Seriousness of consequences .08
Social consensus .07
Temporal immediacy .04
Proximity .03
Step 5 DR2 .01
Model F 5.70*** 8.50*** 21.85*** 38.63***
Adjusted R2 .15 .25 .52 .69
N 136 136 136 136
Moral Intensity, Issue Importance, and Ethical Reasoning
123
A different line of inquiry might delve further into the
measurement of the components of moral intensity. It
seems that studies that measure each dimension of moral
intensity with a single item have relatively little difficulty
collapsing the six dimensions into one or two factors;
however, several studies that have used multi-item measures
of moral intensity have found that the items do not
necessarily collapse into a single factor. Certainly, the
results from this study clearly indicate that the factors of
moral intensity do not vary monotonically, and these
results are not alone in the literature. The assumption of
monotonical co-variation seems like an unnecessary generalization
that is preventing the theory and literature from
moving forward to a richer understanding of moral intensity
and its relationship with ethical decision making.
Our second hypothesis was concerned with the relationship
between PIE and the steps of ethical reasoning.
The results from the hierarchical regressions consistently
provided results across both scenarios that are generally
supportive of our hypothesis. In the analyses for both
scenarios, and as hypothesized, PIE had a positive effect on
both recognition of an ethical issue and ethical judgments,
after controlling for social desirability. In addition, PIE had
a positive effect on ethical intentions, but only in Scenario
2. PIE appears to affect the early stages of the ethical
reasoning process; its effects on later stages (e.g., ethical
intentions) also received some support, but not across both
scenarios. These results generally support Hypothesis 2,
which is generally consistent with the preceding theory and
literature. However, we note some important differences.
First, while we hypothesized a positive relationship
between PIE and recognition of an ethical issue consistent
with the proposition in Haines et al. (2008), we hypothesized
a different direction of effect for this relationship.
Even though we have interpreted our results to be supportive
of our hypothesized direction, we acknowledge that
Haines et al. (2008) have provided an alternative hypothesis
of the same relationship, but in a different direction.
The difference between these two perspectives is relevant
to future theoretical development of the ethical reasoning
process and, therefore, merits further scrutiny. Future
research will hopefully be able to resolve this apparent
contradiction. One possible explanation may be that both
perspectives are correct, in that ethical recognition and PIE
co-vary, but that neither actually ‘‘causes’’ the other.
Another explanation may entail a positive bi-directional
feedback loop between these two constructs. Whatever the
resolution, the results may significantly affect future
development of the early stages of ethical reasoning.
The third hypothesis in this study received mixed support.
The seriousness of consequences component of moral
intensity was related to PIE in the analysis of the data from
both scenarios after controlling for social desirability. In
addition, social consensus was related to PIE, but only in
one of the two scenarios (Scenario 1). Neither temporal
immediacy nor proximity was associated with PIE in either
of the scenarios. While these results confirm that some
aspects of moral intensity are related to PIE, they also raise
questions as to whether any of the other aspects of moral
intensity beyond seriousness of consequences will be
consistently related to PIE. Our analysis only investigated
how four of the six dimensions of moral intensity influence
PIE, and one obvious opportunity would be to examine
how all six components of moral intensity function with
respect to PIE. Of course, this line of thought necessarily
leads researchers down the path we have identified earlier—
that the components of moral intensity actually do
operate somewhat independently of one another. To the
extent that this can be demonstrated, this line of inquiry
may prove fruitful at providing a more clear understanding
of the precise relationship between moral intensity and PIE.
One issue which is not clear from this study is whether
PIE acts in some respects as a mediator between moral
intensity and ethical reasoning, or whether PIE is a part of
the process, as suggested by Haines et al. (2008). While
Robin et al. (1996) reasoned that PIE was not a moderator
or a mediator, it is possible from the original definition of
the term and existing theory to propose that PIE mediates
some steps in the previously accepted process of ethical
decision making and/or that PIE mediates some of the
effects of moral intensity on the steps of ethical reasoning.
However, the results of our study suggest that PIE and
moral intensity both affect each other and ethical reasoning,
but all the details have yet to be worked out theoretically
and confirmed empirically. These issues should be
fertile ground for further inquiry.
The study’s results provide some additional insight
beyond research of the PIE construct. For instance, Cronan
et al. (2005) using five scenarios administered to students
found a positive link between PIE and ethical judgments,
as well as a positive relationship between PIE and ethical
intention. Haines et al. (2008) also determined that PIE was
positively related to moral judgment and unrelated to ethical
intention. This current study, using responses provided
by employees of a financial institution and a sophisticated
hierarchical regression analysis, found a connection
between PIE and ethical judgment, but not a consistent
linkage between PIE and ethical intentions. The results
suggest that while PIE and behavioral intention may be
consistently correlated, the actual effect of PIE on ethical
intention likely operates through ethical judgment. In
summary, the results highlight the practical and theoretical
value of PIE and help clarify that the role of PIE tends to
occur earlier in the ethical decision-making process, primarily
influencing the recognition of an ethical issue and
ethical judgment steps.
S. Valentine, D. Hollingworth
123
Finally, we conclude our discussion and suggestions for
future research with one additional suggestion. Because
PIE has been conceptualized as a variable which is primarily
associated with individual affective and/or cognitive
processes, but that also allows for situational effects (such
as moral intensity) to be evaluated together with the perceptions
of importance of an ethical situation, it would
seem that individual differences may moderate the effect of
moral intensity on PIE. This may help explain why we did
not find relationships between the most of the dimensions
of moral intensity and PIE.
Managerial Implications
PIE seems to play an important role in ethical reasoning,
particularly in the early stages of ethical issue recognition
and judgment formation. To the extent that managers can
create and influence an environment that is supportive of
enhanced PIE, they are encouraging ethical decision
making in their organizations. For instance, codes of conduct
can be developed to enhance employees’ perceptions
that the organization as a whole (executives, managers,
supervisors, workers, etc.) is concerned about ethical
decision making and appropriate behavior. Ethics training
can also be developed to create a stronger culture of
business ethics. Research indeed shows that codes, ethics
training, and other such programmatic approaches can
enhance perceptions of organizational ethics and social
responsibility, which may encourage individuals to behave
ethically (Adams et al. 2001; Loe et al. 2000; McCabe
et al. 1996; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005: Valentine and
Barnett 2002; Valentine and Fleischman 2004, 2008).
The scenarios used in this study were intentionally
developed to cover decisions that are commonly embedded
in and affect the operations of an organization. Operational
problems and decision making frequently involves group or
team-based decisions. This could lead to greater pressure to
develop social consensus in general, and perhaps increased
ethical decision making. Advanced operations practices
prevalent in organizations today, which are also associated
with quality, process improvement, and increased operational
and organizational efficiency and effectiveness (e.g.,
TQM, Six Sigma, JIT, LEAN, and Lean-Six Sigma, etc.),
depend heavily on group and team-based problem solving
and decision making. These operational practices may be
supportive of an organizational context (or culture) that
directly or indirectly enhances ethical decision making. For
example, the presence of these practices, which are supportive
of successful team and group action, are likely to
support heightened awareness of issues affecting others in
the organization, as well as increase perceptions of the
seriousness of consequences; these factors should also
support or enhance the development of social consensus.
Therefore, it is likely that the application of these practices
indirectly supports the development of moral intensity,
which in turn enhances PIE and ethical reasoning. An
ancillary implication is that the development of these
operations practices may indirectly support ethical decision
making.
Research Limitations
This study has several limitations that should be explored.
The study utilized cross-sectional data, so any conclusions
about causality must be interpreted cautiously. As with
most studies of ethics, social desirability bias can have a
potentially adverse affect on the interpretation of results.
This investigation controlled for such bias by including a
measure of social desirability in the analyses, which minimized
the possibility of incorrect findings or interpretational
errors based on subjects’ inherent impression
management. The study utilized information collected
from employees working for only one regional firm and
representing predominantly one ethnic background, so
generalizing beyond this homogenous sampling frame
might not be appropriate. To the extent that issue-contingencies,
PIE, or ethical reasoning vary by ethnicity, cultural
grounding, or the immediate work context, there
could have also been macro-cultural or firm-level biases
that could not be detected or controlled for in the analyses.
The majority of subjects were also not involved in
operations functions in the organization, which potentially
limits the application of results to production or manufacturing
employees. Yet, a post hoc MANOVA indicated that
only one focal variable varied across the professional
groups (p\.05), implying that the findings could be
generalized to other job types such as operations. While the
scenarios were operations-oriented, they were specifically
developed and selected so that most employees could
understand and relate to the ethical issues when making
decisions. This approach, however useful, does not preclude
the possibility of response bias among the different
employee groups. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that
additional studies dealing with these potential weaknesses
are advised, in order to address these concerns before
definitive conclusions can be developed and applied more
broadly to different professional environments.
Suggestions and Concluding Comments
The results of this and other similar studies raise a number
of questions of practical importance. First, what drives
perceptions of importance regarding ethical issues? Almost
certainly, some individual differences would be expected to
affect PIE. However, of more practical managerial significance,
what controllable practices, processes, and/or
Moral Intensity, Issue Importance, and Ethical Reasoning
123
procedures create an operational culture or context that
enhances individuals’ PIE? Answers to this question could
be used to build ethical sensitivity into training and educational
programs for employees.
An increased understanding of PIE in relation to other
variables may be obtained through studies that explore
several questions. Does PIE act as a mediator between
moral intensity and ethical decision making, and does
ethical judgment mediate the relationship between PIE and
ethical intentions? Additional theoretical development and
analysis might tease out a clearer understanding of the
relationship between PIE and ethical issue recognition. It
might be argued that these constructs are merely correlates;
however, it is more likely that one comes before, or drives
the other. Controlled experiments or longitudinal studies
might be particularly useful in examining this question.
Finally, some of the dimensions of moral intensity measured
were found not to directly affect PIE. Consequently,
is it possible that the effects of moral intensity are partly
irrelevant, or is it possible that these factors act as moderators
of the relationship between PIE and ethical reasoning?
Future research should clarify these issues.
This study examined the relationships among PIE, moral
intensity, and the process of ethical decision making, and
key relationships were identified. The results further
establish PIE as a distinct construct related to the process of
ethical reasoning and suggest that PIE may mediate the
relationship between moral intensity and ethical decisions.
These results are noteworthy because outside of work
conducted in purchasing ethics this current study is one of
relatively few attempts to understand ethical reasoning in
the operations management context.
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